Notes

  1. Thomas G. Weiss and Nina Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities: Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict Zones,” J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy, no. 1 (2017): 13, http://www.getty.edu/publications/pdfs/CulturalCleansing_Weiss_Connelly.pdf.↩
  2. Ibid., 16.↩
  3. Ibid., 17, 42.↩
  4. However, see Hugh Eakin, “Use Force to Stop ISIS’ Destruction of Art and History,” New York Times, April 3, 2015. The UN did sanction the use of lethal force in defense of heritage in Mali, although such force was not used.↩
  5. Insofar as the archaeological community engages with ethical issues connected with war, its members seem largely preoccupied with the permissibility of their working with the military.↩
  6. See, for example, Irina Bokova, “Culture on the Front Line of New Wars,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 22, no. 1 (2015): 289–96, at 292. For discussion, see Pierre Losson, “Does the International Trafficking of Cultural Heritage Really Fuel Military Conflicts?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 6 (2017): 484–95.↩
  7. See, for example, Peter Stone (chair, UK Blue Shield), “The Blue Shield: Trying to Prevent Cultural Property Becoming a Victim of Armed Conflict,” Keynote Address, Conference on Digital Preservation of Cultural Heritage, November 19, 2013, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mOk25ZnzR-U.↩
  8. See, for example, Laurie Rush, ed., Archaeology, Cultural Property, and the Military (Woodbridge, Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2010); and Joras D. Kila and Christopher V. Herndon, “Military Involvement in Cultural Property Protection: An Overview,” Joint Forces Quarterly 74, no. 3 (2016): 116–23, at 118.↩
  9. Several such arguments are deployed in Yvette Foliant, “Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense: A Way to Improve Your Mission,” Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence, 2015, https://www.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CPP-Makes-Sense-final-version-29-10-15.pdf. Weiss and Connelly make the claims about economic costs and reconciliation; see “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 13.↩
  10. Raphael Lemkin to James Rosenberg, 13 Sept 1948, box 1, folder 19, Raphael Lemkin Collection, American Jewish Historical Society.↩
  11. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 13.↩
  12. International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty,” December 2001, xii; available at http://www.globalr2p.org/media/files/iciss_report.pdf (emphasis added).↩
  13. Edward C. Luck, “Cultural Genocide and the Protection of Cultural Heritage,” J. Paul Getty Trust Occasional Papers in Cultural Heritage Policy, no. 2 (2018): 20, http://www.getty.edu/publications/pdfs/CulturalGenocide_Luck.pdf.↩
  14. See, for example, T. Camber Warren, “Explosive Connections? Mass Media, Social Media, and the Geography of Collective Violence in African States,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 3 (2015): 297–311; T. Camber Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone: Soft Power, Mass Media, and the Production of State Sovereignty,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 111–41; and David Yanagizawa-Drott, “Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, no. 4 (2014): 1947–94.↩
  15. Warren, “Not by the Sword Alone,” 123.↩
  16. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 13.↩
  17. Some people claim that attacks on heritage are part of genocide. On this view, of course, to defend heritage is to prevent genocide. But this semantic move—broadening the definition of genocide—doesn’t show that one can use force to defend heritage. It simply makes it an open question whether one may use force to prevent genocide.↩
  18. Bokova’s account of cultural genocide partly draws on this idea; see “Culture on the Front Line of New Wars,” 290.↩
  19. The justificatory standard for detention is of course somewhat lower, but it would, we think, be naive to think that military interventions would involve merely detaining perpetrators rather than physically harming them.↩
  20. Here we follow Joseph Raz’s influential taxonomy of value, as defended in The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 178.↩
  21. Janna Thompson, “War and the Protection of Property,” in Civilian Immunity in War, ed. Igor Primoratz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 239–56, at 253. See also Janna Thompson, “Art, Property Rights, and the Interests of Humanity,” Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (2004): 545–60.↩
  22. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 13. Bokova shares this view. See also James Henry Merryman, “Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property,” American Journal of International Law 80 (1986): 831–53; and James Cuno, Who Owns Antiquity? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).↩
  23. Thompson, “War and the Protection of Property,” 246.↩
  24. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 13.↩
  25. Ibid., 6.↩
  26. “Culture under Fire,” Forum for European Philosophy, London School of Economics, January 17, 2018, audio at http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3967, at 38 minutes.↩
  27. Ibid., at 39 minutes.↩
  28. See https://ukblueshield.org.uk/, accessed April 1, 2019.↩
  29. Nausikaä El-Mecky, “Inside the UNESCO Conference to Save Syria’s Heritage,” Apollo, June 10, 2016, https://www.apollo-magazine.com/inside-the-unesco-conference-to-save-syrias-heritage/.↩
  30. Bokova, “Culture on the Front Line of New Wars,” 294.↩
  31. “UNESCO Reports on Extensive Damage in First Emergency Assessment Mission to Aleppo,” UNESCO, January 19, 2017, http://whc.unesco.org/en/news/1619/.↩
  32. Second Protocol (1999) to the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Art. 12.↩
  33. ICISS, “The Responsibility to Protect,” xii.↩
  34. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 38.↩
  35. Ibid., 34.↩
  36. Ibid., 38 (emphasis added).↩
  37. Ibid., 34.↩
  38. Ibid., 45.↩
  39. See, for example, Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Massimo Renzo, “Political Self-Determination and Wars of National Defense,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, no. 6 (2018): 706–30; and Helen Frowe, “Defending Defensive Killing,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 15, no. 6 (2018): 750–66.↩
  40. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 35.↩
  41. See, for example, Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 2015), 56–59.↩
  42. Proportionality is thought by some writers to subsume the requirement that force have a reasonable prospect of success. See, for example, Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 1 (2005): 34–66; and Jeff McMahan, “Just Cause for War,” Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 3 (2005): 1–21, at 5. For criticism, see Frowe, Defensive Killing, 148–53. The relationship between proportionality and necessity is complex (see, for example, Seth Lazar, “Necessity in Self-Defense and War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, no. 1 [2012]: 3–44), but our characterization here is that standardly employed by just war theorists.↩
  43. As evidenced by the Hague Convention, the lack of clarity concerning necessity and proportionality also plagues attempts to regulate the destruction and protection of heritage during war.↩
  44. Weiss and Connelly, “Cultural Cleansing and Mass Atrocities,” 45.↩
  45. See, for example, Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and Morality at War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).↩
  46. For discussion of defense against political threats (i.e., threats to sovereignty), see David Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” in The Morality of Defensive War, ed. Cécile Fabre and Seth Lazar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 69–89; Jeff McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?,” in Fabre and Lazar, The Morality of Defensive War, 115–56; Helen Frowe, “Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence against Political Aggression?,” in Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume 1, ed. David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne, and David Wall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 173–93; and Renzo, “Political Self-Determination and Wars of National Defense.”↩
  47. For discussion of defense against unjust occupation of one’s home (and comparisons with defensive war), see Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence,” 84–85; Frowe, “Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence against Political Aggression?,” 183–86.↩
  48. “Culture under Fire,” http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=3967, audio at 38 and 39 minutes.↩
  49. Philosophers disagree about whether (some) harms that do not themselves warrant lethal defense can warrant such defense when aggregated. See McMahan, “What Rights May Be Defended by Means of War?”; Rodin, “The Myth of National Self-Defence”; and Frowe, Defensive Killing, 125–29.↩
  50. For discussion of the concern regarding children, see Jeff McMahan, “Humanitarian Intervention, Consent, and Proportionality,” in Ethics and Humanity: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Glover, ed. N. Ann Davis, Richard Keshen, and Jeff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 53; and Helen Frowe, “Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, ed. Don E. Scheid (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 95–112, at 108–9.↩